[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
some learning theorists, FM 100-5 was a deliberate attempt by the senior
Army leadership to drive the organization to adapt to the changing
world order. According to General Gordon Sullivan, chief of staff of the
Army at the time, this revision corresponded to a critical time in Army
history that required senior leadership to drive change. 22 The combi-
nation of the end of the Cold War, dramatic downsizing, and an in-
creased operational tempo requiring back-to-back deployments made it
clear to Sullivan that doctrine needed to be updated. Moreover, the
dif9 culties the Army had had in mobilizing for Desert Storm convinced
him that the new doctrine had to work for a new, more mobile, rapidly
deployable Army. As discussed above, the result was a meeting of the se-
20. FM 100-5 had been updated in 1968, 1976, 1982, and 1986. The 1982 version
had introduced AirLand Battle Doctrine.
21. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC, 1986);
Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC, 1982).
22. Sullivan and Harper, Hope Is Not a Method.
140 " lifting the fog of peace
nior Army generals in September 1991 in which they considered
whether it was time to rewrite Army doctrine for contingency opera-
tions, peacekeeping, power projection, and other aspects of the Army s
rapidly evolving missions. 23 This group of leaders was attempting to do
for their generation what AirLand Battle Doctrine did for the generation
before lead change.
According to accounts and interviews of some of the key players, the
addition of the MOOTW chapter was not a unanimous decision among
this group of the Army s most senior generals. As Sullivan explained,
there were those in the room who felt that we had just demonstrated [in
the Gulf War] that we were the world s best Army, so if we needed to
change and mix up the artillery or something, 9 ne, but nothing more. 24
Other key players in addition to Sullivan including General George
Joulwan, commander of Southern Command; General Carl Steiner, com-
mander of Special Forces Command; and General Fred Franks, com-
mander of Training and Doctrine Command became the strongest and
most in: uential advocates of including a chapter on MOOTW.25 While
General Sullivan s approach was not to order the doctrine writers to in-
clude the chapter, he admits that it was no mystery what his wishes were.
General Joulwan, however, took a more activist approach.
As the commanding general of Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
at the time, Joulwan was charged with leading the drug war in the West-
ern Hemisphere. Recognizing that NGOs had expertise and assets that
the military did not possess, Joulwan learned quickly that success in such
nonstandard environments required the coordinated efforts of these dis-
parate entities. Because he had come to believe very strongly that future
U.S. military operations were more likely to resemble his multinational,
interagency, SOUTHCOM experience than the force-on-force efforts in
the Gulf War, he advocated that the MOOTW chapter be included as the
opening chapter to the new FM 100-5. In the end, the MOOTW chapter
was included as chapter 13. Not surprisingly, many of the lessons learned
from Joulwan s experience in the drug war (i.e., on interagency cooper-
ation, the importance of understanding NGOs, etc.) were directly
re: ected in the MOOTW chapter.26
23. Sullivan, interview; Sullivan and Harper, Hope Is Not a Method.
24. Sullivan, interview.
25. Richard Duncan Downie, Learning from Con: ict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Sal-
vador, and the Drug War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); Joulwan, interview; Sullivan and
Harper, Hope Is Not a Method.
26. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC, 1993).
Doctrine and Education for the New Force " 141
Army FM 100-23 Peace Operations
The following year, the Army published a new, more speci9 c, MOOTW
manual, FM 100-23 Peace Operations. This publication directly cited Pres-
ident Clinton s Presidential Decision Direction 25 as justi9 cation for fo-
cusing speci9 cally on peace operations.27 Following FM 100-5 s chapter
on MOOTW, in which peace operations were discussed as a subcategory
to operations other than war, FM 100-23 sought to provide more de-
tailed doctrinal guidance for the full range of peace operations, to in-
clude support to diplomacy (peacemaking, peace building, and preven-
tive diplomacy), peacekeeping (PK), and peace enforcement (PE). 28
Importantly, the manual incorporates lessons learned from recent
peace operations and existing doctrine. 29 Operations Provide Comfort
and Restore Hope are referenced directly throughout the manual, indi-
cating an attempt to institutionalize critical lessons from these experi-
ences. Prior to FM 100-23, of9 cers had been referencing an infantry
school white paper, The Application of Peace Enforcement (PE) at the Brigade
and Battalion Level.30 Accordingly, the white paper informed the writing
of FM 100-23.
FM 100-23 emphasizes planning and logistics. Appendixes are in-
cluded to introduce of9 cers to other nonmilitary actors likely to be pres-
ent in the peace operations environment, such as the United Nations,
U.S. government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs.
Although this manual provided a much-needed top-level resource for
commanders, it was still quite thin on speci9 c guidance. This lack of
speci9 city extended to the guidance for peace operations training,
where the manual conveyed more mixed messages to commanders
charged with preparing their units for such missions.
In appendix C, Training, FM 100-23 begins with the following fa-
miliar statement: Training and preparation for peace operations should
not detract from a unit s primary mission of training soldiers to 9 ght and
win in combat. It goes on to point out, Peace operations . . . should not
be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit s mission-essential task
list (METL). However, units selected for these duties require time to
27. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations (Washington, DC,
1994).
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. U.S. Army Infantry School Commandant, White Paper: The Application of Peace En-
forcement (PE) at the Brigade and Battalion Level (Fort Benning, GA, August 31, 1993).
142 " lifting the fog of peace
train and prepare for a signi9 cant number of tasks that may be different
from their wartime METL. 31 Finally, as if to highlight the collective
schizophrenia over how and if U.S. forces should prepare for these mis-
sions, the paragraph ends with this statement: The philosophy used to
determine the how much and when training questions for operations
other than war can be summed up as just enough and just in time. 32 This
confusing message suggests that the manual s authors were well aware of
the political debates over MOOTW missions at the time. To suggest
signi9 cant changes to unit METLs or training regimes would have been
a highly controversial step. In the end, such decisions were left to indi-
vidual commanders.
A few division commanders (i.e., the 82nd Airborne and the 25th
Light Infantry) did take the initiative to add peace operations tasks to
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]