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they are capable of being reformed one should rather come to the assis-
tance of their character or their property, inasmuch as this is better and
more characteristic of friendship. But a man who breaks off such a
friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange; for it was not to a
man of this sort that he was a friend; when his friend has changed,
therefore, and he is unable to save him, he gives him up.
But if one friend remained the same while the other became better
and far outstripped him in virtue, should the latter treat the former as a
friend? Surely he cannot. When the interval is great this becomes most
plain, e.g., in the case of childish friendships; if one friend remained a
child in intellect while the other became a fully developed man, how
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could they be friends when they neither approved of the same things nor
delighted in and were pained by the same things? For not even with
regard to each other will their tastes agree, and without this (as we saw)
they cannot be friends; for they cannot live together. But we have dis-
cussed these matters.
Should he, then, behave no otherwise towards him than he would if
he had never been his friend? Surely he should keep a remembrance of
their former intimacy, and as we think we ought to oblige friends rather
than strangers, so to those who have been our friends we ought to make
some allowance for our former friendship, when the breach has not been
due to excess of wickedness.
4
Friendly relations with one s neighbours, and the marks by which friend-
ships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man s relations to
himself. For (1) we define a friend as one who wishes and does what is
good, or seems so, for the sake of his friend, or (2) as one who wishes
his friend to exist and live, for his sake; which mothers do to their chil-
dren, and friends do who have come into conflict. And (3) others define
him as one who lives with and (4) has the same tastes as another, or (5)
one who grieves and rejoices with his friend; and this too is found in
mothers most of all. It is by some one of these characterstics that friend-
ship too is defined.
Now each of these is true of the good man s relation to himself (and
of all other men in so far as they think themselves good; virtue and the
good man seem, as has been said, to be the measure of every class of
things). For his opinions are harmonious, and he desires the same things
with all his soul; and therefore he wishes for himself what is good and
what seems so, and does it (for it is characteristic of the good man to
work out the good), and does so for his own sake (for he does it for the
sake of the intellectual element in him, which is thought to be the man
himself); and he wishes himself to live and be preserved, and especially
the element by virtue of which he thinks. For existence is good to the
virtuous man, and each man wishes himself what is good, while no one
chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become some one
else (for that matter, even now God possesses the good); he wishes for
this only on condition of being whatever he is; and the element that
thinks would seem to be the individual man, or to be so more than any
other element in him. And such a man wishes to live with himself; for he
Nicomachean Ethics/151
does so with pleasure, since the memories of his past acts are delightful
and his hopes for the future are good, and therefore pleasant. His mind
is well stored too with subjects of contemplation. And he grieves and
rejoices, more than any other, with himself; for the same thing is always
painful, and the same thing always pleasant, and not one thing at one
time and another at another; he has, so to speak, nothing to repent of.
Therefore, since each of these characteristics belongs to the good
man in relation to himself, and he is related to his friend as to himself
(for his friend is another self), friendship too is thought to be one of
these attributes, and those who have these attributes to be friends. Whether
there is or is not friendship between a man and himself is a question we
may dismiss for the present; there would seem to be friendship in so far
as he is two or more, to judge from the afore-mentioned attributes of
friendship, and from the fact that the extreme of friendship is likened to
one s love for oneself.
But the attributes named seem to belong even to the majority of
men, poor creatures though they may be. Are we to say then that in so
far as they are satisfied with themselves and think they are good, they
share in these attributes? Certainly no one who is thoroughly bad and
impious has these attributes, or even seems to do so. They hardly belong
even to inferior people; for they are at variance with themselves, and
have appetites for some things and rational desires for others. This is
true, for instance, of incontinent people; for they choose, instead of the
things they themselves think good, things that are pleasant but hurtful;
while others again, through cowardice and laziness, shrink from doing
what they think best for themselves. And those who have done many
terrible deeds and are hated for their wickedness even shrink from life
and destroy themselves. And wicked men seek for people with whom to
spend their days, and shun themselves; for they remember many a
grevious deed, and anticipate others like them, when they are by them-
selves, but when they are with others they forget. And having nothing
lovable in them they have no feeling of love to themselves. Therefore
also such men do not rejoice or grieve with themselves; for their soul is
rent by faction, and one element in it by reason of its wickedness grieves
when it abstains from certain acts, while the other part is pleased, and
one draws them this way and the other that, as if they were pulling them
in pieces. If a man cannot at the same time be pained and pleased, at all
events after a short time he is pained because he was pleased, and he
could have wished that these things had not been pleasant to him; for
152/Aristotle
bad men are laden with repentance.
Therefore the bad man does not seem to be amicably disposed even
to himself, because there is nothing in him to love; so that if to be thus is
the height of wretchedness, we should strain every nerve to avoid wick-
edness and should endeavour to be good; for so and only so can one be
either friendly to oneself or a friend to another.
5
Goodwill is a friendly sort of relation, but is not identical with friend-
ship; for one may have goodwill both towards people whom one does
not know, and without their knowing it, but not friendship. This has
indeed been said already. But goodwill is not even friendly feeling. For
it does not involve intensity or desire, whereas these accompany friendly
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